### 1ac

#### Aesthetic considerations guide public opposition to wind power development – they’re seen as ugly because they offend aesthetic norms for landscape and nature

Miles 8 (Brian, “PUTTING AESTHETICS IN ITS PLACE IN THE VERMONT WIND POWER DEBATE” https://library.uvm.edu/jspui/bitstream/123456789/146/1/BrianMiles-Thesis-.pdf)

As studies by Warren et al. (2005) confirm, and others have argued (Brittan 2001; Pasqualetti et al. 2002; Woods 2003; Burall 2004; Brisman 2005; Good 2006), aesthetic concerns are a primary motivation of those campaigning against wind energy development. Brisman (2005) cites avian mortality and aesthetic degradation as two recurring concerns of opponents to wind development off of Cape Cod, MA and on Glebe Mountain in Londonderry, VT (p. 69). He argues that avian mortality concerns can be mollified by selecting sites outside of areas with high bird activity while aesthetic objections are harder to understand and to address (pp. 73-74).4 These aesthetic objections to wind energy are based on the visual degradation that opponents argue such developments would impose on the landscape (Brittan 2001; Pasqualetti et al. 2002; Brisman 2005, p. 74) rather than worries over noise pollution, which Brisman (2005) assumes is a problem isolated to earlier utility-scale wind technologies (p. 76).5 As Brittan (2001) observes: “much of this opposition … is grounded in a rather sharp separation between nature and technology, expressed in the thought that wind turbines … in the landscape are ugly” (p. 169, cited in Woods 2003, p. 277). Brittan identifies four ways that contemporary wind energy developments “offend aesthetic and culturally-constructed notions of landscape and nature” (Woods 2003, p. 277): (1) they are alien to the environment and there is uncertainty over whether their growth, as with weeds, will stop once it has begun; (2) they are out of harmony with the landscape; (3) they are out of scale with what surrounds them; (4) they are devices that are beyond the understanding and engagement of local inhabitants.

#### Legal and political opposition is similarly informed by aesthetic criteria – upholding a beautiful landscape means opposing wind

Blinder 9 (Dana, “Wind Power: Clean, Renewable, but Too Ugly for Some”

http://www.rodale.com/regulation-windmills-and-wind-power)

A recent bill proposed in North Carolina seeks to eliminate large-scale wind turbines from state mountaintops due to aesthetical concerns. The windmills catch air and turn it into electricity, supplying it to a local utility grid to distribute as renewable energy to customers. According to the American Wind Energy Association (AWEA), in 2005 the U.S. had the ability to generate enough electricity through wind power to meet the energy needs of about 1.6 million American households for an entire year. As of 2004, the U.S. was the third leading country in the world in wind capacity. THE DETAILS: The North Carolina bill proposes removal of industrial-size turbines 100 feet or taller from the western edge of the state. The legislation for the turbine restriction bill has since been sent back to the committee. If passed, the bill would restrict about two-thirds of the state’s wind-energy potential. The good news is that even if energy-efficient, large-scale turbines may soon be a thing of the past for North Carolina, the bill would not affect residential-size turbines. If you’ve been pondering a turbine of your own, the idea may not be as crazy as you think. Half the landmass in the United States has average winds of at least a power class 2 (about 13 mph), deemed by the AWEA to be sufficient to reap the benefits of wind energy. The western mountains of North Carolina have winds between power classes 3 and 6. WHAT IT MEANS: Proposals like the North Carolina bill mean an uphill battle for widespread use of wind energy to provide electricity. And that’s bad news, since wind is one of the cleanest, most sustainable ways to create electricity, producing no toxic emissions, or ones that contribute to global warming. Coal-produced energy requires billions of gallons of cooling water, damages mountains and streams, creates smog, soot, and acid rain, rapidly accelerates global warming, and emits toxic air emissions. The ash and sludge left behind is laced with heavy metals and other carcinogenic chemicals. Coal creates more than half of the nation’s energy, and is also its single biggest source of air pollution. When you weigh the health and environmental benefits, turbines don’t look so bad. In fact, they’re kind of cute.

#### It’s even prohibited on National Scenic Trails

**Vann 12** [February 1, 2012, Adam Vann, “Legislative Attorney "Energy Projects on Federal Lands: Leasing and Authorization]

As with oil, gas and geothermal leasing, not all federal lands are available for wind and solar¶ renewable energy project rights-of-way. Lands designated as Wilderness Areas and Wilderness¶ Study Areas, National Monuments, National Conservation Areas (with the notable exception of¶ the California Desert Conservation Area), National Wild and Scenic Rivers, and National Historic¶ and Scenic Trails, are categories of land not open to solar and wind energy development.172 In¶ addition, some special management areas, such as Areas of Critical Environmental Concern, may¶ not be suitable for development.173

#### It’s no accident that the Forest Service uses the phrase "scenic integrity." Metanarratives of scenery dating back to the 16th century label wind farms as ugly. This concept of scenery has its roots in transcendent ideals of beauty and their political implications

**Brittan 9** [1/16/9 Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology Newsletter, “Fitting Wind Power to Landscape: A Place-Based Wind Turbine”, Gordon G. Brittan, Jr., Brittan is a farmer-rancher and professor of philosophy at Montana State University]

Wind turbines somehow do not “fit” in the landscape. From one point of view (classical), landscapes are beautiful to the extent that they are “scenic,” well-balanced compositions. But wind turbines introduce a discordant note; they are out of “scale.”¶ From another point of view (ecological), landscapes are beautiful if their various elements form a stable and integrated organic whole. But wind turbines are difficult to integrate into the biotic community. At least in certain respects, they are like “weeds.”¶ Moreover, there is a reason why the 100-meter, three-bladed wind turbines now favored by the industry cannot very well be accommodated to any landscape view. They are, as philosopher Albert Borgmann would argue, distanced “devices” for the production of a commodity rather than “things” with which one can engage.¶ I argue here that the only way in which the aesthetic resistance to wind turbines can be overcome is to make them more “thing-like.¶ In attempting to understand public antagonism to conventional wind turbines, we need to understand the character of contemporary technology. No one has done more to clarify it, in my view, than Borgmann (1984), who begins with a distinction between “devices” (those characteristic inventions of our age, among which the pocket calculator, the CD sound system, and the jet plane might be taken as exemplary) and what philosopher Martin Heidegger calls “things” (not only natural objects, but human artifacts such as the traditional windmills of Holland). The pattern of contemporary technology is the device paradigm, which is to say that technology has to do with “devices” as against “things.”¶ Things “engage” us, an engagement which is at once bodily, social, and demands skill. A device, in contrast, disengages and disburdens us. It makes no demands on skill and, in this sense, is disburdening. Further, a device is defined in functional terms—it is anything that serves a certain human-determined function.¶ In other words, a device is a means to procure some human end. Since the end may be obtained in a variety of ways (in other words, devices can be functionally equivalent), a device has no intrinsic features.¶ But a device also “conceals” and, in the process, disengages. The way in which the device obtains its ends is literally hidden from view. The more advanced the device, the more hidden from view it is, sheathed in plastic, stainless steel, or titanium.¶ Moreover, concealment and disburdening go hand in hand. The concealment of the machinery—the fact that it is distanced from us—insures that it makes no demands on our faculties. The device is socially disburdening as well in its isolation and impersonality.¶ · ¶ To make the analysis of “devices” more precise, an objection should be considered. “Is not…the concealment of the machinery and the lack of engagement with our world,” Borgmann asks, “due to widespread scientific, economic, and technical illiteracy?” That is, why in principle can we not “go into” contemporary devices; “break through” their apparent concealments? Why should we not promote electrical engineering, for example, as a general course of study, and in the process come to know if not also to love contemporary technology?¶ Borgmann initially answers this objection in terms of three points.¶ · First, many devices, e.g., the pocket calculator, are in principle irreparable; they are designed to be thrown away when they fail. In this case, there is no point in “going into” the device.¶ · Second, many devices, e.g., the CD sound system, are in principle carefree; they are designed not to need repair. It is not necessary to go into such devices.¶ · Third, many devices, e.g., the jet plane, are in fact so complex that it is not really possible for anyone but a team of experts to go in to them. Increasingly, this is true of older technologies as well—e.g., automobiles, where “fixing” has become tantamount to “replacing” their various computerized components.¶ Borgmann contends that, even if technical education made much of the machinery of devices perspicuous, two differences between devices and “things” would remain. Our engagement with devices would remain “entirely cerebral,” since they resist “appropriation through care, repair, the exercise of skill, and bodily engagement.”¶ Moreover, the machinery of a device is anonymous. It does not express its creator—“It does not reveal a region and its particular orientation within nature and culture.” On both counts, devices remain unfamiliar, distanced and distancing. Typing these words, looking at the monitor on which they appear, I have no real relation to the process or to the machinery involved, no context in which to place them, no knowledge of their origins or of their development. The only thing that really matters is the product.¶ · ¶ Borgmann’s interpretation of technology and the character of contemporary life can be criticized in a number of ways. Still, the distinction between “things” and “devices” reveals, I think, the essence of our inability to develop a landscape aesthetic on which contemporary wind turbines are or might be beautiful and thereby explains the widespread resistance to placing them where they might be seen.¶ The fact of the matter is that contemporary wind turbines are for most of us merely devices. There is therefore no way to go beyond or beneath their conventionally uncomfortable appearance to the discovery of a latent mechanical or organic or what-have-you beauty. The attempt to do so is blocked from the outset by the character of the machine.¶ Think about it for a moment: Except for the blades, virtually everything is shielded, including the towers of many turbines, hidden from view behind the same sort of stainless steel that sheathes many electronic devices. Moreover, the machinery is located a great distance away from anyone, save the mechanic who must first don climbing gear to access it and often, for liability reasons, behind chain-link fences and locked gates.¶ The lack of disclosure goes together with the fact that the turbines are merely producers of a commodity, electrical energy, and interchangeable in this respect with any other technology that produces the same commodity at least as cheaply and reliably.¶ The only important differences between wind turbines and other energy generating technologies are not intrinsic to what might be called their “design philosophies.” That is, while they differ with respect to their inputs, their “fuels,” and with respect to their environmental impacts, the same sort of description can be given of each. There is, as a result, but a single standard on the basis of which wind turbines are to be evaluated—efficiency. It is not to be wondered that they are, with only small modifications among them, so uniform.¶ · ¶ In terms of this uniformity, wind turbines are very much unlike other architectural arrivals—for example, houses and traditional windmills. Different styles of architecture developed in different parts of the world in response to local geological and climatic conditions, to the availability of local materials, to the spiritual and philosophical patterns of the local culture. As a result, these buildings create a context.¶ In Heidegger’s wonderful, dark expression, these buildings “gather.” But there is nothing “local” or “gathering” about contemporary wind turbines. They are everywhere and anonymously the same, whether produced in Denmark or Japan, placed in India or Spain—alien objects impressed on a region and in no deeper way connected to it. They have nothing to say to us, nothing to express, no “inside.” They “conceal” rather than “reveal.” The sense of place that they might eventually engender cannot, therefore, be unique.¶ In addition, wind turbines are quintessential “devices” in that they preclude engagement. Or rather, the only way in which the vast majority of people can engage with them is visually (and occasionally by ear). People cannot climb over and around them, they cannot get inside them, they cannot tinker with them. They cannot even get close to them. There is no larger and non-trivial physical or biological way in which they can be appropriated or their beauty grasped.¶ The irony, of course, is that, precluded from any other sort of engagement with wind turbines, most people find them visually objectionable, though they might be willing to countenance their existence as the lesser of evils.¶ · ¶ In short, there is not an immediately available aesthetic norm on which wind turbines are “landscape-beautiful”—i.e., there is not an immediately available and adequate conception of “landscape” on which they “fit in.” Furthermore, the “device-like” character of wind turbines forecloses the possibility that on a deeper analysis some new and more generous aesthetic norm might be developed. In a straightforward sense, these turbines are all “surface.”¶ At least so far as the American experience is concerned, the sheer complexity of contemporary wind turbines entails that they must be grouped in rather large arrays so that installation, maintenance, and repair costs can be minimized. This requirement entails, in turn, that they be owned and operated by large companies. Like other energy-generating technologies, their immediate contact is “industrial.” But this fact is problematic for a variety of reasons.¶ To begin with, the immense size of the arrays standard in the United State is visually objectionable. Typically, they so completely dominate the horizon that it is difficult to integrate them in any sort of way with their landscape, even in a rather distant perspective.¶ Furthermore, the fact that these arrays are owned and operated by large companies, whose bankers and boards of directors live and work far away from the site, diminishes any sense of local connection and, more importantly, of local responsibility and control. Those who make the decisions regarding wind farms are not the same people who must live with them on a daily basis. It is a lesson we in this country have been slow to learn, but those “on the ground,” who have a sense of the bounds of both tradition and environment, in general, make the best land-use decisions.¶ On one hand, therefore, wind energy can grow out of local communities, in which case the turbines are for the most part sited, owned, and operated by local residents. On the other hand, these machines can be imposed “from outside.” In the first case, the wind turbine has potentially a more “organic” connection to the whole and may help to express the life of the people who live there as something they have freely chosen.¶ The question of local control, as of individual comprehension, is thus tied closely to aesthetic appreciation. What we cannot understand or control might be sublime, but it can never, for the same reason, be beautiful. There is always and necessarily the question of scale.¶ · ¶ The other point to be emphasized is that local communities tend to have some sort of biological basis. They are defined at least in part by the plant and animal life of the region, the kind and quality of the soil, the available rainfall and adjacent watersheds. In short, communities are characterized not simply in abstract terms—in terms of mutual trust and a willingness to sacrifice for the common good—but also in terms of “place” and “history.”¶ To the extent that standardized machines are plunked down in a standardized way, then no matter who owns them, the local character of the community is weakened if not also destroyed, and with it the possibility of feeling “at home” in it. To feel oneself at home in the world, we first have to orient ourselves with respect to it, and this involves being able to recognize and distinguish between things.¶ As just indicated, these “places” are often identified with an individual terrain and a particular watershed. But they could just as well be identified with a windshed. In my part of the country, the characteristic winds come in the middle of winter when we most need them, raising temperatures and blowing snow off the ground and (at least potentially) providing the power to heat homes. We call them “chinooks.” They are part of our lives, in the same way that the “mistral” is part of the life of the Midi, the “bise” of the Lavaux, or the “foehn” of the Schwarzwald.

#### This strategy is mirrored in current wind power debates – both sides think that their aesthetic perceptions of wind power are objectively correct

**Good 6** [Justin Good received a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Boston University and has taught at the University of Connecticut and Emerson College "The Aesthetics of Wind Energy" Human Ecology Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2006]

And so we reach the same dialectical impasse that is¶ being reached across the United States these days in debates¶ about wind farm proposals. Both sides claim that their aesthetic sense is shaped by the perception and love of natural¶ beauty. But whereas the NIMBY wind appreciator recoils¶ from the look of the wind farm because it violates the look of¶ nature, the aesthetic appreciator likes the look of the wind¶ farm because it expresses ecological rationality, regardless of¶ its physical make-up. The disagreement is confusing because¶ both sides are (a) appealing to some objective sense of beauty or ugliness, and (b) relating that perceived beauty to nature¶ and relating ugliness to some kind of destructive degradation¶ of nature. And yet, they are having opposite experiences and¶ contradictory judgments. It’s practically a paradox!

#### This political strategy of exclusion based on aesthetics mirrors the way that political practices operate – It’s no surprise that the dominant group is the one that gets to affirm beauty – this has historically been used as a tool to marginalize other bodies

Craig 2k6 (Maxine, “Race, beauty, and the tangled knot of a guilty pleasure” Feminist Theory 2006 7: 159)

Discourses of race and beauty are often intertwined. Racist ideologies commonly promote the appearance of the dominant group against the purported ugliness of a subordinate group. When, in his ‘Notes on the State of Virginia’ Thomas Jefferson sought to defend a continued separation of the races, he pointed to what he considered the self-evident beauty of whites (Jefferson, 1975: 187). Likewise, Nazis used assertions of superior Aryan beauty to build anti-Semitism (Mosse, 1985: 139). Claims of beauty have also been central to anti-racist resistance. When Marcus Garvey built a mass African-American movement in the early 20th century, he implored black people to ‘take down the pictures of white women from your walls. Elevate your own women to that place of honor’ (Garvey, 1968: 29). In Garvey’s nationalist rhetoric, racial pride began with an appreciation of the beauty of black women. Despite the close connections between discourses of beauty and racial politics, race has often been left out of feminist analyses of beauty. If we take the 1968 Miss America pageant protest as a historical beginning point for second wave feminist activist critiques of beauty regimes in the United States, we can see that an analysis of the interpenetration of racism and beauty regimes was present at the beginning. The organizers of the 1968 Miss America contest protest decried the racial exclusivity of the pageant, noting that there had never been a black finalist nor a single Puerto Rican, Alaskan, Hawaiian or Mexican-American winner (Morgan, 1970: 586). Though early activists found and critiqued racism and sexism in institutions of beauty, an analysis of race escaped some of the most widely read academic feminist writing on beauty that followed. This section traces the presence, absence and reappearance of race in feminist theories of beauty. My account cannot be strictly chronological, as in some cases early writers and activists had greater sensitivity to issues of race than writers who followed them. In this narrative, I organize the works considered into those that are foundational, those that engaged in a project of specifying differences in women’s experiences of beauty, and those that complicated existing theory by addressing questions of agency. Given the wealth of feminist writing relating to beauty, this survey is necessarily incomplete and will inevitably omit important work. Works are included here because they articulate central tendencies within the literature. Lois Banner’s 1983 American Beauty laid important historical groundwork for subsequent feminist scholarship on beauty. By chronicling the transformation of beauty standards in the United States, Banner demonstrated the constructed and historically specific character of ideals of beauty. As written by Banner, however, beauty’s American history is a white women’s history. Joan Jacobs Brumberg’s study of decades of young women’s diaries documents the way that the expansion of marketing to young women increased women’s self-consciousness regarding their bodies. Given that women who have enjoyed certain privileges are more likely to keep diaries and have them collected by archives, the experience documented in Brumberg’s study was primarily that lived by white middle- and upper-class women. Nonetheless, Brumberg’s 1997 The Body Project importantly challenged the common assumption that young women have always been anxious about the appearance of their bodies. Young women’s diaries written in the 19th century were less focused on outer beauty. As the reach of marketing increased throughout the 20th century, young women were more likely to write about their bodies in their diaries and more frequently expressed dissatisfaction with their shapes and weight. Published in the 1980s, essays by Iris Marion Young and Sandra Lee Bartky were also foundational.1 Young and Bartky articulated feminist analyses of women’s beauty work as a disciplinary practice policed by the force of a coercive and pervasive male gaze. These works were indispensable for later feminist writing and practice relating to beauty, yet the woman who was their subject was a racially unmarked, implicitly heterosexual woman of an unspecified class. In Young’s essay ‘Throwing Like a Girl’, the essence of the female experience is a physical passivity caused by ‘the ever-present possibility that one will be gazed upon as a mere body, as shape and flesh that presents itself as the potential object of another subject’s intentions and manipulations, rather than as a living manifestation of action and intention’ (Young, 1980: 154). Women take up the view of themselves as things ‘looked at and acted upon’, and use cosmetics, diets, and other disciplinary practices in attempts to craft themselves into more beautiful things (Young, 1980: 148). In this argument, a woman sees herself as men see her, and the embodied actions a woman takes are usurped by male intentions. She acts upon herself to realize the will of a generalized male gaze. From the present vantage point, Young’s argument appears not incorrect but incomplete. Young’s essay vividly describes and explains the selfconsciousness regarding appearance that male domination imposes on women. Whether measured by the grossly disproportionate amounts of money spent by women on beauty care or the higher rates of eating disorders and cosmetic surgery use among women, it is clear that women, as a group, work to change their appearance more than men do. The feelings of inadequacy produced by the presence of beauty standards in women’s lives are, arguably, among the most personal manifestations of gender inequality in our lives. That being said, the essential woman she describes is that racially unmarked, implicitly heterosexual woman, of unspecified class. Connected to no community, she stands alone under the male gaze. The gazing male is similarly unspecified. What happens if we rethink the argument, with the understanding that the woman under the gaze has a race, a sexual identity, an age, abilities, and more or less wealth? Does she still stand alone in relation to the gaze? Which techniques of transformation are available to her, which are impossible, and what are the meanings of those techniques within her community? When, and if, she sees herself through the eyes of a male, what is his race and how does his race affect her assumptions about what he sees? Is he also the target of an objectifying gaze? Sandra Lee Bartky similarly describes beauty work as a product of the female self-surveillance that arises from the male gaze. Yet she describes the beautifying woman as active rather than passive. According to Bartky, women actively construct feminine selves, the only selves that patriarchal regimes support, or risk the ‘annihilation’ that awaits those who refuse to embrace socially acceptable subjectivities (Bartky, 1988: 78). Bartky’s self-monitoring women, like Young’s, are generalized women who stand alone. Each woman, because she is not envisioned as a member of any social group based on race, class, age, sexuality, or ability, is equally alone, and subject to a generalized male gaze. Beginning in the 1980s, and continuing to the present, a sizeable group of scholars has engaged in a project of specifying, in various ways, women’s experiences of beauty standards. These works document and analyse the racism inherent in dominant beauty standards (Banet-Weiser, 1999; Banks, 2000; Bordo, 1993; Candelario, 2000; Chapkis, 1986; Craig, 2002; DuCille, 1996; Espiritu, 1997; Gilman, 1985; Hobson, 2003; Kaw, 2003; Lakoff and Scherr, 1984; Peiss, 1998; Weitz, 2004). Focusing on the diverse and particular ways that dominant beauty standards positioned white, black, and Asian women, these scholars argue that beauty standards maintained racial inequality as well as gender inequality. Much of this scholarship addressed the polarized positions of black women and white women in dominant beauty regimes. Dominant beauty standards that idealized fair skin, small noses and lips, and long flowing hair defined black women’s dark skin colour, facial features, and tightly curled, short hair as ugly. In many, but not all representations, black women’s bodies were also stigmatized as hypersexual, a characterization that positioned black women as the moral opposites of pure white women. The ordeal of Saartjie Baartman, the black South African woman who was transported to London and Paris in 1810 and exhibited barely clothed as an entertaining spectacle, is emblematic of the abusive representation of black women as the hypersexual other (Gilman, 1985). Saartjie Baartman was dubbed the ‘Hottentot Venus’, a name that identified her as a stigmatizing symbol of beauty for a defamed group within a colonial context (Hobson, 2003). The exclusion of non-white women, or their marginalization within representations of beauty, supported the place of white women within beauty regimes. That is, racists defined white and chaste beauty in opposition to the imputed ugliness and hypersexuality of other, racially marked, groups of women (Collins, 2004; hooks, 1992; Omolade, 1983). Writers who have considered the position of contemporary non-white women in beauty regimes have variously found categorical exclusion of women of colour, appreciation of the beauty of women of colour to the extent that they approached the appearance of whiteness, or the inclusion of a changing spectrum of women of colour in the marginalized and marked position of the exotic beauty. A shifting economic and geopolitical context underlies these alternative and unstable positions of women of colour in beauty regimes. Asian women were portrayed as monstrous in 19th-century caricatures drawn by whites engaged in nativist politics. In later periods, when exclusionary immigration laws removed Asian workers from competition with American workers, Asian women were represented as exotic beauties (Espiritu, 1997). African-American women, who were categorically excluded from representations of beauty prior to the Civil Rights Movement, have, within the past forty years, along with the emergence of a sizeable black middle class, gained inclusion in fashion industry and cinematic representations of beauty, albeit often in ways that continue to mark them as exotic (DuCille, 1996). Among these authors Susan Bordo provides the broadest theoretical basis for understanding how beauty regimes locate women in specific valued or devalued positions. She argues that representations of beauty produce norms for women, ‘against which the self continually measures, judges, “disciplines,” and “corrects” itself’ (Bordo, 1993: 25). Her argument was more than a restatement of that advanced by Bartky and Young, because of Bordo’s sustained consideration of the ways that race matters in women’s experience of dominant beauty standards. Racism and sexism intertwine in the form of a normalizing discourse that marks women of colour as abnormal and thus flawed.

#### We repudiate strategies that apply beauty standards to political or social contexts, as it applies to wind, as it applies to energy, as it applies to politics, and as it applies to even interaction itself.

#### Vote aff to affirm the politics of ugliness.

#### Beauty as a concept allows for exclusionary violence. Our rejection is a social function to reclaim aesthetics

Mingus 2011 (Mia, Full text of a keynote address for the Femmes of Colour symposium, queer physically disabled woman of color, korean transracial and transnational adoptee writer and organizer “moving towards the ugly” <http://leavingevidence.wordpress.com/2011/08/22/moving-toward-the-ugly-a-politic-beyond-desirability/>)

As femmes of color—however we identify—we have to push ourselves to go deeper than consumerism, ableism, transphobia and building a politic of desirability. Especially as femmes of color. We cannot leave our folks behind, just to join the femmes of color contingent in the giant white femme parade. As the (generational) effects of global capitalism, genocide, violence, oppression and trauma settle into our bodies, we must build new understandings of bodies and gender that can reflect our histories and our resiliency, not our oppressor or our self-shame and loathing. We must shift from a politic of desirability and beauty to a politic of ugly and magnificence. That moves us closer to bodies and movements that disrupt, dismantle, disturb. Bodies and movements ready to throw down and create a different way for all of us, not just some of us. [\*share North Carolina story] The magnificence of a body that shakes, spills out, takes up space, needs help, moseys, slinks, limps, drools, rocks, curls over on itself. The magnificence of a body that doesn’t get to choose when to go to the bathroom, let alone which bathroom to use. A body that doesn’t get to choose what to wear in the morning, what hairstyle to sport, how they’re going to move or stand, or what time they’re going to bed. The magnificence of bodies that have been coded, not just undesirable and ugly, but un-human. The magnificence of bodies that are understanding gender in far more complex ways than I could explain in an hour. Moving beyond a politic of desirability to loving the ugly. Respecting Ugly for how it has shaped us and been exiled. Seeing its power and magic, seeing the reasons it has been feared. Seeing it for what it is: some of our greatest strength. Because we all do it. We all run from the ugly. And the farther we run from it, the more we stigmatize it and the more power we give beauty. Our communities are obsessed with being beautiful and gorgeous and hot. What would it mean if we were ugly? What would it mean if we didn’t run from our own ugliness or each other’s? How do we take the sting out of “ugly?” What would it mean to acknowledge our ugliness for all it has given us, how it has shaped our brilliance and taught us about how we never want to make anyone else feel? What would it take for us to be able to risk being ugly, in whatever that means for us. What would happen if we stopped apologizing for our ugly, stopped being ashamed of it? What if we let go of being beautiful, stopped chasing “pretty,” stopped sucking in and shrinking and spending enormous amounts of money and time on things that don’t make us magnificent? Where is the Ugly in you? What is it trying to teach you? And I am not saying it is easy to be ugly without apology. It is hard as fuck. It threatens our survival. I recognize the brilliance in our instinct to move toward beauty and desirability. And it takes time and for some of us it may be impossible. I know it is complicated. …And I also know that though it may be a way to survive, it will not be a way to thrive, to grow the kind of genders and world we need. And it is not attainable to everyone, even those who want it to be. What do we do with bodies that can’t change no matter how much we dress them up or down; no matter how much we want them to? What about those of us who are freaks, in the most powerful sense of the word? Freakery is that piece of disability and ableism where bodies that are deformed, disfigured, scarred and non-normatively physically disabled live. Its roots come out of monsters and goblins and beasts; from the freak shows of the 1800’s where physically disabled folks, trans and gender non-conforming folks, indigenous folks and people of color were displayed side-by-side. It is where “beauty” and “freak” got constructed day in and day out, where “whiteness” and “other” got burned into our brains. It is part of the legacy of Ugly and it is part of my legacy as a queer disabled woman of color. It is a part of all of our history as queer people of color. It is how I know we must never let ourselves be on the side of the gawking crowd ever again in any way. It is the part of me that doesn’t show my leg. It is the part of me that knows that building my gender—my anything—around desirability or beauty is not just an ableist notion of what’s important, but will always keep me chasing what doesn’t want me. Will always keep me hurling swords at the very core of me. There is only the illusion of solace in beauty. If age and disability teach us anything, it is that investing in beauty will never set us free. Beauty has always been hurled as a weapon. It has always taken the form of an exclusive club; and supposed protection against violence, isolation and pain, but this is a myth. It is not true, even for those accepted in to the club. I don’t think we can reclaim beauty. Magnificence has always been with us. Always been there in the freak shows—staring back at the gawking crowd, in the back rooms of the brothels, in the fields fresh with cotton, on the street corners in the middle of the night, as the bombs drop, in our breaths after surviving the doctor’s office, crossing the border, in the first quiet moments of a bloody face after the attack is done. Magnificence was there. Magnificence was with me in the car rides home after long days being dehumanized, abused and steeled in the medical industrial complex. It was there with me when I took my first breaths in my mother’s arms in Korea, and a week later those first days alone without her realizing I wasn’t going home. Magnificence has always been with us. If we are ever unsure about what femme should be or how to be femme, we must move toward the ugly. Not just the ugly in ourselves, but the people and communities that are ugly, undesirable, unwanted, disposable, hidden, displaced. This is the only way that we will ever create a femme-ness that can hold physically disabled folks, dark skinned people, trans and gender non-conforming folks, poor and working class folks, HIV positive folks, people living in the global south and so many more of us who are the freaks, monsters, criminals, villains of our fairytales, movies, news stories, neighborhoods and world. This is our work as femmes of color: to take the notion of beauty (and most importantly the value placed upon it) and dismantle it (challenge it), not just in gender, but wherever it is being used to harm people, to exclude people, to shame people; as a justification for violence, colonization and genocide. If you leave with anything today, leave with this: you are magnificent. There is magnificence in our ugliness. There is power in it, far greater than beauty can ever wield. Work to not be afraid of the Ugly—in each other or ourselves. Work to learn from it, to value it. Know that every time we turn away from ugliness, we turn away from ourselves. And always remember this: I would rather you be magnificent, than beautiful, any day of the week. I would rather you be ugly—magnificently ugly.

#### Beauty is defined by difference—it requires ugly as a condition of existence—this value structure manifests in intersecting forms of oppression

Kuhne 2010 (Thomas “Struggling for Beauty: Body Aesthetics and Social Conflict in Modern History”

<http://www.humiliationstudies.org/documents/KuehneStrugglingforBeauty.pdf>)

Beauty matters. That it matters can be easily measured by the amount of money and the time people spend on making their bodies beautiful. Since the 1990s, beauty, understood as body aesthetics, has drawn scholarly attention in various disciplines, but has escaped closer examination in social and cultural history. Sociology, psychology, literature, and visual arts have focused on hegemonic discourses; black studies and gender studies have investigated in nonhegemonic body aesthetics. Inspired by these works, Struggling for Beauty provides what is missing in current academic and popular discussions: an inquiry in the historical fluidity of rivaling body aesthetics. Which notions of beauty have been constructed by different societies? In a book-length essay focusing on the period from the eighteenth century to the present, I will link issues of self and society, body culture and visual culture, regional particularities and globalization to show how and why modern societies struggle for beauty. Beauty defines difference on its own**—**beautiful versus ugly—and has been seen as a marker of virtue, strength, and wealth. In modern societies, it has often been linked to other categories of social difference such as race and gender. I shall examine such linkages as well as how beauty has emerged as a special category of difference. Though racist and gendered notions of beauty always have been powerful, in the late nineteenth century a new conception of beauty emerged—beauty as the visual expression of physical health, to be achieved individually by regular exercise, healthy nutrition and appropriate lifestyle. Since that time, the idea that beauty is available to everyone has been popularized by mass media, consumer goods, mass sports, star cults, beauty pageants, and cosmetic surgery. The message is clear: You can do it! Everyone can get it! Body aesthetics have grown into a defining feature of the self, of individual identity. In praising the young, slim, athletic, and ‘Aryan’ body, the modern beauty cult has commodified racist ideas of the Enlightenment philosophers. Yet the beauty cult has operated paradoxically to make race, gender, and class invisible. East Asians seeking plastic surgery to ‘westernize’ their eyelids and to lengthen their children’s leg bones indicate the globalization of the western beauty cult. Western fashion and cosmetics seduce consumers all over the world by merging social, sexual and racial diversity into a vision of cosmopolitan harmony. When did this development start and who supported it? In fact, the praise of the blond, slim, fit and ‘sexy’ body has been opposed by ethnic, religious, youth and regional cultures, by feminist movements, scientific institutions, and different lifestyles. Regional beauty pageants sometimes require that contestants adopt an “authentically” local appearance: their antagonism toward national or global beauty queens is not subtle. Afros, dreadlocks, and “natural” hairstyles may (though they need not) signal a visual protest against whatever is considered oppressive or “unmodern” in dominant culture. What counts in many religious cultures is “inner” beauty or, rather, how close one comes to an idealized image of “goodness” (indicated for example by the earlocks of orthodox Jews). Economic considerations are seldom irrelevant. Peasant societies appreciated corpulence in either sex as beautiful rather than as ugly. Why? In subsistence societies corpulence indicates wealth, health, and, in females, fertility and motherhood.

#### Our engagement with ugliness should be understood within the context of unease with non-normative aesthetics – recognition of the POWER of ugliness pushes back against cultural norms of shunning – the 1ac isn’t a reclaiming of beauty but rather an affirmation of ugly

Devereaux 2k5 (Mary, Ph.D., is a philosopher in the Research Ethics Program at the University of California, San Diego “The Ugly” <http://www.aesthetics-online.org/articles/index.php?articles_id=24>)

Ugliness is a topic largely neglected by aestheticians. This neglect no doubt has many roots. Here I’d like to explore just one, namely our uneasiness with saying that people are ugly. We speak readily enough about the moral failings of our fellows, e.g., the duplicity of political leaders or the psychological shortcomings of neighbors, relatives and co-workers. Why then does calling someone ugly make us so uneasy? We shun mention of the ugly, it seems to me, for a number of reasons. First, we naturally enough do not want to think of ourselves as ugly – especially not in the present tense. The thought that others might find us ugly is unsettling and embarrassing, particularly in a culture such as ours, where, rightly or wrongly, success, esteem and love rest so heavily upon physical appearance. So, too we generally try to avoid attributing ugliness to others. Calling the ugly ‘ugly’ – recognizing someone as ugly – is thought to be undemocratic and cruel. Undemocratic because even with a pluralistic conception of beauty, some people are going to lose. It’s bad luck, but a fact. Recognizing the ugly is cruel because, whether the judgment is mistaken (as in the case of Pecola’s self-hatred in Toni Morrison’s The Bluest Eye) or correct (as with Frankenstein’s monster), calling someone ugly may do as much or more damage as calling them a liar or a cheat. Unlike lying or cheating, ugliness seems to have few excuses, a situation worsened, ironically, by the readily availability of the cosmetic fix and the raising of the bar of “standard” good looks. Hence many of us are rightly reluctant to apply the predicate ‘ugly’ to human beings. The discomfort I am describing is intensified by a long intellectual tradition associating beauty with goodness and ugliness with evil. While a extensive line of physically attractive villains from Vronsky to Rhett Butler attests to the falseness of this connection, an equally entrenched narrative tradition insists upon its truth, using ugliness as a mark of bad character if not downright wickedness (e.g., the ugly stepmothers and stepsisters of Grimm’s fairytales). Alternatively, ugliness and the social ostracism it (unfairly) provokes may turn the good man bad, as the tale of Frankenstein’s creature and a range of others illustrate. The point is that one way or another, an ugly face is frequently associated with a form of moral badness. Medical and scientific traditions take a different slant, linking ugliness with physical rather than moral flaws, specifically with forms of ill-health. Thus the ugly comes to be taken as a reminder of our own aging, vulnerability to illness, disability, and death. Lastly, there’s the connection between beauty and happiness (or success). Aristotle’s answer to the question of whether an ugly man can be truly happy was “No,” although for reasons too complicated to pursue here. We needn’t agree of course. (Literature holds out the promise that Beauty will fall in love with the Beast – although notice, in story after story, the ‘Beast’ turns out to be a handsome prince in disguise). Recent empirical investigations of the strong correlation between felicitous looks and success in the workplace or marriage market auger even less well for the uncomely. Now in all three of these accounts, ugliness is identified with a form of badness, but the negativity in question is extrinsic. In the first case, the real object of our negative judgment is not ugliness itself but the bad moral character with which it is (wrongly) associated. In the second case, the real object of our negative judgment is again not ugliness itself, but its purported relationship with poor health and human vulnerability. So, too, in the third case where the real object of our negative judgment is the ill-fortune presumed to follow from poor looks. In each of these instances we have good reason to be suspicious of the judgments in question because of the unsavory political and social agendas with which they are associated. The more closely we look, the more evident the inappropriateness or unfairness of the negative value attached to ugliness and the more obvious the reasons why it is not discussed. The topic is largely avoided. But should it be? Is the role of the ugly fully accounted for by reference to fashion and prejudice? Or is there something bad about ugliness itself? Once we separate the ugly from its connection with views about morality, health and happiness, does any of its badness remain? Or is it the aim of an analysis of the ugly that no one turns out to be ugly? Is the idea to embrace a kind of eliminitivism about the ugly? The eliminativist analysis of the ugly parallels eliminitivism about race. On this account, no one turns out to be ugly because there is no such thing as ugliness (only, for example, veiled misogyny, racism, ageism and intolerance of difference) just as we’re to suppose, there is no such thing as a genuine, i.e., intersubjectively valid, standard of beauty. Clearly there is a tension between not wanting to embrace the eliminativist position – one that denies the proposition that we do find some people ugly – and not wanting to endorse the proposition that some people are just ugly. Perhaps judgments of the ugly would cause less trouble if we could avoid predicating ugliness of people. But a culture enthralled with the possibilities of cosmetic transformation makes it difficult to avoid the conclusion not that a few of us are ugly, but that most of us are. And while we may accept that we should not say that people are ugly, it is another thing altogether to insist that we should not find them so. In short, what I am raising in these remarks is possibility that the idea of the ugly – and in particular aesthetic judgments of the ugly – bears further investigation. With this proposal, I suspect, no one will disagree. Moving in this direction builds directly on the revival of interest in the concept of beauty and work at the intersection of aesthetics with race studies, disabilities studies, feminist theory and the history of cosmetic surgery. More controversial perhaps is the idea that the ugly bears examination in its own right. What I have been pointing to is that there seem to be (some) judgments of ugliness, period. What I have in mind here is a category of judgment that attributes intrinsic ugliness to its object, characteristics that are visibly unpleasant in their own right, independent of assumptions about bad health, bad character or ill-fortune. What leads me to this claim is this. Many feminists and other cultural critics assume that certain features or looks (small breasts, a wrinkled brow, the so-called Jewish nose) are falsely presented as ugly. The idea is that such negative judgments are or may be mistaken. If this is right, then in order to tell that such judgments are wrong, we have to have some idea of what it would be to make a correct judgment of ugliness. We need, in other words, some standard by which to separate intrinsic from extrinsic attributions of ugliness and for this we need a philosophical analysis of the ugly. We need in other words to answer the question of how ugliness in its own right is to be understood. And that, of course, is a question for aesthetics. Undertaking such an analysis may of course open aestheticians to certain political or social objections. Many of the same reasons that make talk of ugliness objectionable on racialist or gendered grounds may lead aestheticians to want to deny any possibility of intrinsic ugliness. This reluctance, particularly where human beings are concerned, is natural and proper. But it should, I suggest, be tempered by a willingness to acknowledge that social anxieties about personal misfortune, unfairness and the intractability of our attraction to beauty constitute a meaningful component of life as well as art. Perhaps it is time for the ugly to garner some of the attention routinely bestowed on its more comely cousin, beauty.

#### Even if beauty is good, we should reject its objective imposition – we identify, in solidarity with objects and beings marked as ugly alike

Craig 2k6 (Maxine, “Race, beauty, and the tangled knot of a guilty pleasure” Feminist Theory 2006 7: 159)

In 1968 inside the convention centre in Atlantic City, fifty women competed to be crowned Miss America. On the boardwalk outside of the hall, another group of women dumped bras, girdles, and false eyelashes into a trash bin to protest ‘the degrading mindless-boob-girlie symbol’ (Morgan, 1970: 585–6). The Women’s Liberation protest at the Miss America pageant attracted extensive news coverage and brought the second wave of the feminist movement into the awareness of a broader public. Many women appreciated the demonstration, which, regardless of its use of theatrical techniques, took seriously the ways in which beauty standards were oppressive to women. For others, the demonstration suggested that the women’s movement was out of touch with women’s ambivalence regarding beauty. The protesters did not seem to see that, despite the coercive pressures of beauty standards, women derive pleasure from beauty. The meaning of beauty in women’s lives continues to be a problem for feminist theory. Feminist scholarship remains caught between two competing analyses of beauty. One frames beauty as part of a structure of oppression. The other describes beauty as a potentially pleasurable instrument of female agency. Perhaps feminist theory remains stalled in this dichotomy because it has been asking the wrong questions about beauty. Michel Foucault raised new questions about the guilty pleasures of sex when he theorized sex as a product of disciplinary institutions and knowledge regimes. He encouraged his readers to ask of any ‘specific discourse on sex . . . appearing historically and in specific places . . . what were the most immediate, the most local power relations at work’ (Foucault, 1990: 97). This paper examines several specific instances of the deployment of beauty. It asks which women claimed beauty for themselves, who proclaimed the beauty of others, and what was at stake when beauty was claimed. As I explore the deployment of beauty, I will put race at the centre of my analysis. I do this with the understanding that race is co-constructed with gender and class. Thus, to write accurately about race, I also write about gender and class. The difficulty of theorizing beauty is that any body which might possibly be characterized as beautiful exists at a congested crossroads of forces. Bodies provide us with a principal means of expression, yet our bodies are read in ways that defy our intentions. We act on others through our bodies, but nonetheless our bodies are the sites of the embodiment of social controls. The body is the locus of our pleasures and it is the vehicle through which we consume. Our bodies are the targets and the subjects of advertisements. Our bodies mark us in ways that place us in social categories and these categories may form the bases of political solidarities. Each of these uses and meanings of the body can involve beauty. The meeting of these diverse forces in our bodies confounds broad generalizations we might make about the meaning of beauty in women’s lives. I suggest that we look at beauty as a gendered, racialized, and contested symbolic resource. Since beauty is contested, at any given moment there will be multiple standards of beauty in circulation. By thinking about competing beauty standards and their uses by men and women in particular social locations, we can ask about the local power relations at work in discourses and practices of beauty and examine the penalties or pleasures they produce. If we take this approach, oppression and the production of pleasure, domination and resistance no longer exclude each other. Our dichotomies will collapse.

### Schlag

#### vote aff to affirm the imperfections of the 1AC against a cult of beauty – this is about the aesthetics of argument

**Schlag, '2** [Pierre, Dheidt’s Real Father/BFF and Byron White Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law, “Commentary: The Aesthetics of American Law” 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1047]

The various aesthetics, as suggested, are more or less conducive to various political or ethical tendencies. Perhaps a more helpful way of putting it is that political or ethical tendencies are themselves expressed in terms of the various aesthetics. It would be difficult, for instance, to articulate what we call "progressive legal thought" without the energy aesthetic and its images of energy, motion, and change. Similarly, it would be difficult to articulate multiculturalism or identity-politics without perspectivism. And similarly, it would be difficult to articulate conservatism without at some point relying on the notion of status quo and some notion of the grid. Not only do political tendencies depend upon aesthetic commitments, but arguably, it is also an intrinsic aspect of a political tendency (progressive change, multiculturalism, conservatism, etc.) to assert and affirm its own aesthetic. To put it yet another way, none of the political tendencies mentioned above are indifferent to aesthetics. **To be a conservative or a progressive is not just to take certain "substantive" positions, but to be committed to a particular aesthetic of social and political life.** At the same time, a political tendency is often obliged to play on someone else's aesthetic turf. Sometimes, even the insistent assertion of one's own aesthetic will encounter resistance, perhaps fatal resistance. Recall the failed attempts of the Supreme Court at the turn of the twentieth century to limit Congress's commerce power by drawing a grid-like distinction between commerce, on the one hand, and manufacturing, mining, and agriculture, on the other. [n222](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1285963865432&returnToKey=20_T10249922497&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.350160.1565320562#n222) Or recall the "all deliberate speed" and "prompt start" formulae of Brown II, [n223](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1285963865432&returnToKey=20_T10249922497&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.350160.1565320562#n223) which despite the invocation of an energy aesthetic, failed to summon the energy [\*1111] necessary to overcome the inertia of well-entrenched, architecturally inscribed dual school systems. [n224](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1285963865432&returnToKey=20_T10249922497&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.350160.1565320562#n224) Another reason that a political tendency cannot simply be yoked to a particular aesthetic is that there are political objectives that each political tendency will strive to reach (the energy aesthetic), certain positions it cannot surrender (the grid aesthetic), contextual considerations that must be accommodated (the perspectivist aesthetic), and things that must be fudged because they cannot be stabilized (the dissociative aesthetic). [n225](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1285963865432&returnToKey=20_T10249922497&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.350160.1565320562#n225) All of this is to say that despite its own irreducible aesthetic, each political tendency is also driven by its "substantive commitments." And in service of those commitments, any political tendency will at times opportunistically compromise or even jettison its own aesthetic. Arguably, **within any political tendency there are trade-offs, conscious or not, between form and substance, aesthetics and politics**. Viewed from the dissociative aesthetic, this very point is suspect. Indeed, it is not clear at all that politics and aesthetics are sufficiently well differentiated either conceptually or as social formations to allow us to speak cogently of a "trade-off." The relation of form and substance only arises as a political problem once form has been somehow differentiated from substance. [n226](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1285963865432&returnToKey=20_T10249922497&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.350160.1565320562#n226) The felt need as well as the attempt to link form to substance and law to politics depends upon a prior separation of the two. Simply to presume an unproblematic separation is to eclipse an important point about politics and power: if law is an aesthetic construct, then **the moment at which an aesthetic is** asserted or **deployed is a** **moment of power**. [n227](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1285963865432&returnToKey=20_T10249922497&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.350160.1565320562#n227) This is the point at which someone affirms a certain distinction - the grid - or asserts a normative goal - energy. The dissociative aesthetic enables us to step back and look askance: Why picture [\*1112] the situation in terms of a distinction, or a goal, at all? Why are these positions helpful or even possible? B. On Being Taken in There are, of course, **rhetorical uses of the aesthetics**. To the extent that these aesthetics are recognizable forms in law or legal thought, it becomes possible to characterize positions, arguments, and views as instances of this or that aesthetic. In other words, **a "substantive position**" **can be characterized/distorted**, for instance, **as** energy-like and then be criticized in terms of the vices characteristic of the energy **aesthetic**. Such rhetorical efforts can work precisely because we are accustomed to seeing law, legal arguments, theories, and the like in terms of these aesthetics. **Consciously or not, we will read "substantive positions" in terms of these aesthetics**. To the extent that **legal professionals** are unaware of the aesthetics of law, they **can be induced or seduced into accepting political or moral conclusions that they would not otherwise accept**. A wonderful example is provided by a typical reaction to the opinions in Griswold v. Connecticut.[n228](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1285963865432&returnToKey=20_T10249922497&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.350160.1565320562#n228) Typically, law students want to find the "uncommonly silly law" [n229](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1285963865432&returnToKey=20_T10249922497&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.350160.1565320562#n229) banning the sale of contraceptives unconstitutional. They also wish to recognize a constitutional right of privacy. Nonetheless, they experience Justice Stewart's dissent, which denies the existence of a constitutional right of privacy, as a solid and compelling argument. Justice Stewart writes: As to the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, I can find nothing in any of them to invalidate this Connecticut law ... . ... . What provision ... then, does make this state law invalid? The Court says it is the right of privacy "created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." With all deference, I can find no such general right of privacy in the Bill of Rights, in any other part of the Constitution, or in any case ever before decided by this Court. [n230](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1285963865432&returnToKey=20_T10249922497&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.350160.1565320562#n230) Why is this argument compelling? In particular, why does it seem compelling to legal professionals, including possibly Justice Stewart himself, who wanted to find this "uncommonly silly law" unconstitutional? By way of answer, notice the aesthetic representation of the Constitution in Justice Stewart's dissent. Justice Stewart repeatedly divides "The Constitution" into discrete parts: discrete provisions, distinct constitutional amendments, separate cases. He invokes and evokes the [\*1113] grid. If Justice Stewart's argument seems compelling, it is because he has pictured the Constitution as an inert thing subdivided into "parts" and "provisions," none of which contain the words "right of privacy." Correspondingly, Justice Stewart exemplifies the image of the ideal grid judge. The boundaries of the law have already been set. The grid is in place, and the question is: can a judge find a right of privacy anywhere within the boundaries of any part of the Constitution? No. Look in any part of the Constitution. It's just not there. So if Justice Stewart's ultimate conclusion seems convincing, it is largely because his grid-like depiction of the Constitution is compelling. Justice Stewart's Constitution and his argument are clear, fixed, static, and solid. His opinion has the sobriety of law. By contrast, Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court reads more like an amateur exercise in metaphysical poetry than law. Justice Douglas's Constitution is in motion. Indeed, it is so much in motion that its trajectories can seem somewhat confusing. According to Justice Douglas, the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights yield certain "emanations"; these in turn form "penumbras." [n231](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1285963865432&returnToKey=20_T10249922497&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.350160.1565320562#n231) In this case, those penumbras "create" (a word used repeatedly by Justice Douglas) a "zone of privacy." [n232](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1285963865432&returnToKey=20_T10249922497&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.350160.1565320562#n232) His opinion evokes motion, expansion, sweep, light, and shadow. One will recognize the energy aesthetic at work. Justice Douglas's Constitution is energized: it moves; it does actual work. Strikingly though, his argument seems unpersuasive. The reason is simple: it looks like all the reasoning is being done by a patchwork of images and metaphors. The reader almost cannot fail to recognize that Justice Douglas's images are doing all the work (and that these images seem contrived). This contrasts sharply with Justice Stewart's opinion, in which the aesthetic remains hidden. It is hard to be taken in by an aesthetic when someone throws it in your face, which is precisely what Justice Douglas does. Notice, however, that once the aesthetics are revealed, Justice Stewart's image of the Constitution as a collection of parts organized in an inert grid is no more obviously compelling than Justice Douglas's view of the Constitution as extending the protection of rights. In fact, once we cast Justice Douglas's hyperboles aside, what he does for constitutional rights in Griswold is not very different from what Chief Justice Marshall did somewhat more elegantly for the powers of Congress in M'Culloch v. Maryland. [n233](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1285963865432&returnToKey=20_T10249922497&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.350160.1565320562#n233) [\*1114] The point is that one can be taken in by the aesthetics of law. A position that may seem inexorable, or compelling, may upon reflection turn out to be an effect of operating or thinking within a particular aesthetic - **one that is itself neither necessary nor particularly appealing**. In Griswold, for instance, once one recognizes Justice Stewart's deployment of a grid-like aesthetic, his opinion loses much of its rhetorical power. [n234](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1285963865432&returnToKey=20_T10249922497&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.350160.1565320562#n234)Legal professionals can be taken in by aesthetic images for the simple reason that the aesthetics are taken to be the articulation of law itself. And one ends up, as often as not, working within an aesthetic that is not at all hospitable to one's own political or ethical views. The reverse, of course, is also true: one is sometimes taken in by a political or ethical view that is not at all conducive to one's own aesthetics.

### 2ac at: performative pedagogy

#### Performative pedagogy fails in the context of a competitive debate -- there is no rigorous criteria for deciding whether or not we have sufficiently "performed" our pedagogy

Medina and Perry '11 Mia, University of British Columbia, Carmen, Indiana University "Embodiment and Performance in Pedagogy Research: Investigating the Possibility of the Body in Curriculum Experience" Journal of Curriculum Theorizing Volume 27, Number 3, 2 http://www.academia.edu/470170/Embodiment\_and\_performance\_in\_pedagogy\_The\_possibility\_of\_the\_body\_in\_curriculum

Jean-Luc Nancy (1994) reminds us that **our endeavour to write about embodiment fails before it begins, as the body is impenetrable** by the means that we have at our disposal — words,ink, page, computer. And we would add that **the endeavour to talk about the body is also challenging if not futile, due to the discourses that we have at the ready, that is, the dominant discourses of the mind**. In the face of this methodological predicament, Caroline Fusco (2008)regrets that **in educational research a “discursive and material disinfecting and cleansing take[s] place” in the transcription of body and space to written or visual texts** (p. 160). In the following analysis, we acknowledge the limitations of representing research in the written and visualformat of a journal article, but embrace the affordances that analytic discourses and written text provide. In this way, we aspire to contribute to a much larger conversation that necessarily extends beyond these two authors, beyond this study, and beyond the modalities of written andvisual texts.

#### The negative's performance of black perspectivism and the necessity of situated positionality is cooptes as an elite tool for immiseration -- evaluate the debate as if the speakers are anonymous

Gur-ze-ev, 98 - Senior Lecturer Philosophy of Education at Haifa, (Ilan, “Toward a nonrepressive critical pedagogy,” Educational Theory, Fall 48, <http://haifa.academia.edu/IlanGurZeev/Papers/117665/Toward_a_Nonreperssive_Critical_Pedagogy>)

From this perspective, the consensus reached by the reflective subject taking part in the dialogue offered by Critical Pedagogy is naive, especially in light of its declared anti-intellectualism on the one hand and its pronounced glorification of "feelings", "experience", and self-evident knowledge of the group on the other. Critical Pedagogy, in its different versions, claims to inhere and overcome the foundationalism and transcendentalism of the Enlightenment's emancipatory and ethnocentric arrogance, as exemplified by ideology critique, psychoanalysis, or traditional metaphysics. Marginalized feminist knowledge, like the marginalized, neglected, and ridiculed knowledge of the Brazilian farmers, as presented by Freire or Weiler, is represented as legitimate and relevant knowledge, in contrast to its representation as the hegemonic instrument of representation and education. This knowledge is portrayed as a relevant, legitimate and superior alternative to hegemonic education and the knowledge this represents in the center. It is said to represent an identity that is desirable and promises to function "successfully". However, neither the truth value of the marginalized collective memory nor knowledge is cardinal here. "Truth" is replaced by knowledge whose supreme criterion is its self-evidence, namely the potential productivity of its creative violence, while the dialogue in which adorers of "difference" take part is implicitly represented as one of the desired productions of this violence. My argument is that the marginalized and repressed self-evident knowledge has no superiority over the self-evident knowledge of the oppressors. Relying on the knowledge of the weak, controlled, and marginalized groups, their memory and their conscious interests, is no less naive and dangerous than relying on hegemonic knowledge. This is because the critique of Western transcendentalism, foundationalism, and ethnocentrism declines into uncritical acceptance of marginalized knowledge, which becomes foundationalistic and ethnocentric in presenting "the truth", "the facts", or ''the real interests of the group" - even if conceived as valid only for the group concerned. This position cannot avoid vulgar realism and naive positivism based on "facts" of self-evident knowledge ultimately realized against the self-evidence of other groups.

### Root Cause

#### Aesthetic exclusion is the root cause of racism

Pontynen 2k2 (Arthur, “THE AESTHETICS OF RACE VERSUS THE BEAUTY OF HUMANITY”

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/700191/posts

There is no cultural issue more explosive today than race. It is a matter that continually evades any attempt at rational analysis and instead distorts our politics and inflames the passions. A sad consequence is the debasement of our cultural life. Rather than being united by objects of love, by shared and commonly embraced ideals, we are increasingly divided along racial lines by competing objects of desire, all presumed to be of equal value, each demanding its due. Such competing desires, because they make exclusive, universal claims, cannot possibly be satisfied. At the heart of the deep racial divisions in our nation today is the concept of race itself, which wrongly extrapolates from superficial, physical differences (skin color) to conclusions about substantial, moral differences (ways of perceiving the world, values, and ideas). Consider just a few of the controversies afflicting us recently. Potentially a source of common civic inspiration, the proposed New York City firefighters memorial commemorating heroic responses to the World Trade Center disaster quickly became the focus of an uncivil dispute pitting simple truth and historical accuracy against racial representation and “inclusiveness.” . . . What makes these disputes so utterly puerile is that, for all their superficial differences, both sides agree on a fundamental assumption: that culture is aesthetic, meaning that it is composed solely of facts and feelings of individual and group experiences. The tragedy is that when culture is viewed as aesthetic, race must necessarily dominate our thinking and our values, with no possibility for improvement. Fortunately, we do have a way out of the conundrum of race, and that is to reject it precisely because it is an aesthetic concept—a development that resulted, rather recently, from the Enlightenment—and return to what Western culture perennially strives for: the apprehension, appreciations and realization of beauty. Beauty and Aesthetics The suggestion that racism is an aesthetic-based problem that can be solved by a renewed appreciation for beauty may strike some as odd or naïve. Nonetheless, aesthetics, which came to replace the perennial ideal of beauty, is foundational to the very idea of racism. Let’s clarify our terms to avoid inflaming further an already contentious debate. Just what do we mean by aesthetics and beauty? The term aesthetic is a relatively recent one, coined only in the eighteenth century by philosopher Alexander Baumgarten (Aesthetica, 1750). It literally refers to that which is immediate to experience, that which concerns facts or feelings. The notion of aesthetics is associated with the rise of what is erroneously called the Enlightenment. It coincides with and is based on the rise of scientism (a belief that facts provide all that we can know of the world and life) and emotivism (the premise that moral judgments are mere statements of preference, not obligatory principles measured against some universal standard; thus, to say, “Murder is wrong,” means only, “I hate murder!”). Today the termaesthetic is widely viewed as synonymous with beauty, just as fact is falsely equated with truth. These are false equations, however, because the words represent very different understandings of reality and life. From an aesthetic point of view, reality and life are purposeless; their meaning is a matter of one’s individual tastes. But according to the perennial conception of beauty, reality and life are purposeful and inherently infused with meaning.

### Debate Key

#### Public spaces are key – performative embrace of ugliness shapes the debate space through disrupting and deconstructing binaries existing in arguments and performances in the activity now

Przybyło 2010 (Ela, currently completing a PhD in Women's Studies at York University, “The Politics of Ugliness” <http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_180322_en.pdf>)

Second, ugliness may be deployed strategically, through an active and exaggerated performance of ugliness in public spaces. Since the production of beauty requires not only a specific appearance but also a certain code of behaviours, feminists may strategically enact „ugly‟ behaviours as a means of deconstructing binaries such as beauty/ugliness, clean/dirty, public/private, and man/woman. Bartky refers to „disciplinary practices that produce a body which in gesture and appearance is recognizably feminine‟ (1990, p.65, emphasis added). These disciplinary practices function to prescribe the body’s sizes and contours, its appetite, posture, gestures and general comportment in space and the appearance of each of its visible parts. (p.80) An excessive performance, performative confusion, or complete disregard of these normative behaviours and practices thus allows for a disruption of the conventions of beauty. Karina Eileraas, in „Witches, Bitches, and Fluids‟, explores the performed ugliness of punk and rock girl bands such as Hole. They deploy ugliness through ugly shrieks and wails (1997, p.127), ripped stockings and smudged make-up (p.129), ugly stage aggression (p.129), and the presence of ugly, dirty bodily fluids (p.132). In such ways, Eileraas argues, some girl bands perform ugliness, dismember femininity and normative feminine behaviours, and actively deconstruct spaces of beauty/ugliness and masculinity/femininity through „parad[ing], parrot[ing], and parody[ing]‟ (1997, p.135). It is exactly such multidimensional and excessive performances of ugliness, which create spaces of binary ambiguity and flux. Through acting ugly, and „doing‟ ugly, ugliness is privileged as a site of expression and as an effective feminist tool for unsettling prescriptive norms of behaviour. Finally, ugliness can be deployed strategically through the very act of performative self-naming. At the beginning of this essay, I discussed Kincaid‟s strategy of deploying ugliness against neocolonizers. Edwidge Danticat, on the other hand, provides an instance of the reappropriation or „embrace‟ of the category of ugliness through a deployment of it onto herself. Speaking of the multiple oppressions that Haitian women face, she rallies around a Haitian idiom: we must scream this as far as the wind can carry our voices. “Nou lèd, nou la!” We are ugly, but we are here! (2003, p.27, emphasis added) Through applying the label of ugliness onto herself (and „her people‟), Danticat immobilizes anyone who might want to hurt her by way of using the term „ugly‟ against her. She performs ugliness strategically, through „embracing‟ the category, deploying it in her own name, and reassembling it as something to be proud of. Acknowledging the political implications behind „ugliness‟ – such as racism, colonialism, sexism, and poverty – Danticat refuses to be immobilized by ugliness or by people who may use the term against her. Instead, she exploits it to her own uses, performs it, and deconstructs its meaning through reconfiguring it as a site of pride: as a site of presence, struggle, and endurance.

### New Aff’s Lead to Uncertainty

#### The idea that our argument cannot and should not change—uncertainty and adapting your arguments is PART OF BEING UNCOMFORTABLE—their criticism of new affs is an independent voter because it trades off with our ability to STEP OUTSIDE OUR COMFORT ZONE by reading something like this

**Sholock 12** – Chatham University

(Adale, “Methodology of the Privileged: White Anti-racist Feminism, Systematic Ignorance, and Epistemic Uncertainty”, Hypatia Volume 27, Issue 4, pages 701–714, November 2012, dml)

However, something profound happens in The Color of Fear that troubles the epistemological arrogance and self-deception that epitomize normative whiteness. David frustrates everyone to the point where Victor Lewis, an African American man in the group, finally loses his patience and lashes out in anger at David's willful ignorance. This is a climactic moment in the film and one that I find instructive to white anti-racist efforts both feminist and otherwise. Lee Mun Wah, the filmmaker and facilitator of the discussion, gently but skillfully asks David what is keeping him from believing Victor's claims about pervasive racism: “So what would it mean David, then, if life really was that harsh? What if the world was not as you thought, that [racial injustice] is actually happening to lots of human beings on this earth?” He continues, “What if he knew his reality better than you?” What then occurs is best described as a “lightbulb moment”: David says with uncharacteristic thoughtfulness, “Oh, that's very saddening. You don't want to believe that man can be so cruel to himself and his own kind.” David's comment startlingly echoes what James Baldwin has described as the double-bind of white folk: “White America remains unable to believe that Black America's grievances are real; they are unable to believe this because they cannot face what this fact says about themselves and their country” (Baldwin 1985, 536). David's newfound awareness not only challenges his self-assuredness—as Baldwin suggests—but also his very authority as a knower. In other words, David shifts from the cognitive comforts of not knowing that he doesn't know to the epistemic uncertainties of knowing that he doesn't know.

I admit that The Color of Fear has sometimes made me feel a depressing lack of confidence in the ability of the privileged (myself included) to achieve any kind of mutually reciprocal relationship with the racially and geopolitically oppressed. Yet I believe that it is more accurate to view The Color of Fear as an allegory of hope and possibility for the future of feminism without borders. Of course, it is still uncomfortable to watch The Color of Fear and recognize that I might think and act more like David than I can fully comprehend, that his ignorance is structurally related to my own, and that I will not always know better. Nevertheless, I remind myself that it is the very moment when David admits his ignorance that Victor extends the offer, “from here I can work with you.”

David and Victor's breakthrough indicates that effective coalition across racial and other power inequities might actually benefit from epistemic uncertainty among the privileged. Of course, this observation will likely unsettle whites who are conditioned to assert epistemic mastery and authority. As Pratt admits, “to acknowledge … that there are things that I do not know … [is] an admission hard on my pride, and harder to do than it sounds” (Pratt 1984, 42). However, Bernice Johnson Reagon sagely reminds us that comfort is rarely part of coalition-building, as verified by the contentious conversations in The Color of Fear. Coalition work is “some of the most dangerous work you can do. And you shouldn't look for comfort. Some people will come to a coalition and they rate the success of the coalition on whether or not they feel good when they get there” (Reagon 1983, 359). Accordingly, a methodology of the privileged might embrace the discomforts of epistemic uncertainty as an indication of effectiveness rather than failure within coalitional politics.

Perhaps more than self-reflexivity or racial sedition, epistemic uncertainty is a methodology that highlights the necessary interdependence of the privileged and the oppressed in struggles to eliminate injustice.12 For instance, when David's intellectual confidence finally wavers, he must rely upon the knowledge claims of non-whites in the group. In other words, it is only through Victor's keen understanding of racial oppression and white privilege that David recognizes his ignorance. According to Harding, in order for anti-racist and transnational solidarity to flourish, white women's reliance on insights developed by women of color feminists is “not a luxury but a necessity” (Harding 1991, 282). This methodological directive is itself evidence of the instruction Harding takes from women of color who assert that the epistemic accomplishments of the oppressed hold the key to the eradication of ignorance within feminist theory and praxis (Collins 1986; Narayan 1989; Anzaldúa, 1987; Sandoval 2000).

### Disch

#### Our claim that you can’t reduce our identity to a 9 minute speech is NOT the view from nowhere—they are the other side of the coin by claiming their anti-privilege gives them an a priori insight on reality

**DISCH ‘93** (Lisa J.; Professor of Political Theory – University of Minnesota, “More Truth Than Fact: Storytelling as Critical Understanding in the Writings of Hannah Arendt,” Political Theory 21:4, November)

What Hannah Arendt called “my old fashioned storytelling”7 is at once the most elusive and the most provocative aspect of her political philosophy. The apologies she sometimes made for it are well known, but few scholars have attempted to discern from these “scattered remarks” as statement of epistemology or method.8 Though Arendt alluded to its importance throughout her writings in comments like the one that prefaces this essay, this offhandedness left an important question about storytelling unanswered: how can thought that is “bound” to experience as its only “guidepost” possibly be critical? I discern an answer to this question in Arendt’s conception of storytelling, which implicitly redefines conventional understandings of objectivity and impartiality. Arendt failed to explain what she herself termed a “rather unusual approach”9 to political theory because she considered methodological discussions to be self-indulgent and irrelevant to real political problems.10 This reticence did her a disservice because by failing to explain how storytelling creates a vantage point that is both critical and experiential she left herself open to charges of subjectivism.11 As Richard Bernstein has argued, however, what makes Hannah Arendt distinctive is that she is neither a subjectivist nor a foundationalist but, rather, attempts to move “beyond objectivism and relativism.”12 I argue that Arendt’s apologies for her storytelling were disingenuous; she regarded it not as an anachronistic or nostalgic way of thinking but as an innovative approach to critical understanding. Arendt’s storytelling proposes an alternative to the model of impartiality defined as detached reasoning. In Arendt’s terms, impartiality involves telling oneself the story of an event or situation form the plurality of perspectives that constitute it as a public phenomenon. This critical vantage point, not from outside but from within a plurality of contesting standpoints, is what I term “situated impartiality.” Situated impartial knowledge is neither objective disinterested nor explicitly identified with a single particularistic interest. Consequently, its validity does not turn on what Donna Haraway calls the “god trick,” the claim to an omnipotent, disembodied vision that is capable of “seeing everything from nowhere.”13 But neither does it turn on a claim to insight premised on the experience of subjugation, which purportedly gives oppressed peoples a privileged understanding of structures of domination and exonerates them of using power to oppress. The two versions of standpoint claims – the privileged claim to disembodied vision and the embodied claim to “antiprivilege” from oppression – are equally suspect because they are simply antithetical. Both define knowledge positionally, in terms of proximity to power; they differ only in that they assign the privilege of “objective” understanding to opposite poles of the knowledge/power axis. Haraway argues that standpoint claims are insufficient as critical theory because they ignore the complex of social relations that mediate the connection between knowledge and power. She counters that any claim to knowledge, whether advanced by the oppressed or their oppressors, is partial. No one can justifiably lay claim to abstract truth, Haraway argues, but only to “embodied objectivity,” which she argues “means quite simply situated knowledges.”14 There is a connection between Arendt’s defense of storytelling and Haraway’s project, in that both define theory as a critical enterprise whose purpose is not to defend abstract principles or objective facts but to tell provocative stories that invite contestation form rival perspectives.15

### Subotnik

#### Don’t be fooled—their authenticity tests are just as strategically motivated and self-serving as ours because we’re both trying to WIN AN NDT debate—however, we have offense against their application of this as a reason they don’t have to dispute the value of affirming ugliness

**Subotnik 1998** – professor of law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center (7 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 681)

Having traced a major strand in the development of CRT, we turn now to the strands' effect on the relationships of CRATs with each other and with outsiders. As the foregoing material suggests, the central CRT message is not simply that minorities are being treated unfairly, or even that individuals out there are in pain - assertions for which there are data to serve as grist for the academic mill - but that **the minority scholar** himself or herself hurts and hurts badly.

An important problem that concerns the very definition of the scholarly enterprise now comes into focus. What can an academic trained to [\*694] question and to doubt n72 possibly say to Patricia Williams when effectively she announces, "I hurt bad"? n73 "No, you don't hurt"? "You shouldn't hurt"? "Other people hurt too"? Or, most dangerously - and perhaps most tellingly - "What do you expect when you keep shooting yourself in the foot?" If the majority were perceived as having the well- being of minority groups in mind, these responses might be acceptable, even welcomed. And they might lead to real conversation. But, writes Williams, the failure by those "cushioned within the invisible privileges of race and power... to incorporate a sense of precarious connection as a part of our lives is... ultimately obliterating." n74

"Precarious." "Obliterating." These words will clearly invite responses only from fools and sociopaths; they will, by **effectively precluding objection**, disconcert and disunite others. "I hurt," in academic discourse, has three broad though interrelated effects. First, it demands priority from the reader's conscience. It is for this reason that law review editors, waiving usual standards, have privileged a long trail of undisciplined - even silly n75 - destructive and, above all, self-destructive arti [\*695] cles. n76 Second, by emphasizing the emotional bond between those who hurt in a similar way, "I hurt" discourages fellow sufferers from abstracting themselves from their pain in order to gain perspective on their condition. n77

[\*696] Last, as we have seen, it precludes the possibility of **open and structured conversation** with others. n78

[\*697] It is because of this conversation-stopping effect of what they insensitively call "first-person agony stories" that Farber and Sherry deplore their use. "The norms of academic civility hamper readers from challenging the accuracy of the researcher's account; it would be rather difficult, for example, to criticize a law review article by questioning the author's emotional stability or veracity." n79 Perhaps, a better practice would be to put the scholar's experience on the table, along with other relevant material, but to subject that experience to the same level of scrutiny.

If through the foregoing rhetorical strategies CRATs succeeded in limiting academic debate, why do they not have greater influence on public policy? Discouraging white legal scholars from entering the national conversation about race, n80 I suggest, has generated a kind of cynicism in white audiences which, in turn, has had precisely the reverse effect of that ostensibly desired by CRATs. It drives the American public to the right and ensures that anything CRT offers is reflexively rejected.

In the absence of scholarly work by white males in the area of race, of course, it is difficult to be sure what reasons they would give for not having rallied behind CRT. Two things, however, are certain. First, the kinds of issues raised by Williams are too important in their implications  [\*698]  for American life to be confined to communities of color. If the lives of minorities are heavily constrained, if not fully defined, by the thoughts and actions of the majority elements in society, it would seem to be of great importance that white thinkers and doers participate in open discourse to bring about change. Second, given the lack of engagement of CRT by the community of legal scholars as a whole, the discourse that should be taking place at the highest scholarly levels has, by default, been displaced to faculty offices and, more generally, the streets and the airwaves.

### 2ac taylor

**Regardless of the beneficial movement politics attached to their speech act the attempt to prioritize their own bodies through negation is deeply narcissistic. If you don't have a clear idea of what saying no the aff means you should use the permutation as a concrete challenge to the canonization of aesthetic hierarchies. Identifying with the 1AC as a symbolic action to promote humane social orders is a reason to vote aff that should frame your ballot**

**Taylor, '98** [Clyde R. Taylor, film scholar and literary/cultural essayist, is Professor at the Gallatin School and in Africana Studies, New York University. His publications include Vietnam and Black America and the script for Midnight Ramble, a documentary about early Black independent cinema.“The Mask of Art—breaking the aesthetic contract”]

No form of discursive irony is more important to this analytical frame­work than radical resistance. Without radical resistance, there would be no return of the repressed, no challenge to the canon, or the curriculum, no serious interruption to the monologue of European narcissism—no crisis of knowledge. For all the value of the Aesopian voice, its subtleties, complexities, and relative openness to multiple points of view, that voice might ring with an unsettling hollowness, suggestive of abnegation, lack­ing the presence of another voice and perspective in the neighborhood, less tentative, more promising of a full and complete humanity existing apart from the authorized possibilities and determined to fight for its pre­rogatives. Without doubt, the insinuations of resistance form part of the ex­change among the rivals and competitors for Power, and between Power and its victims, even when those insinuations go unvoiced. Power, para­doxically, longs to hear its rebuttal from its victims, and spends idle mo­ments of reverie elaborately imagining them. **But it is the terrible genius of radical resistance, when it finally breaks into speech, that it is full of unwanted surprises, carrying a menace not really anticipated in the day­dreams of confrontation and debate entertained by the powerful.** Far from what is often imagined, **radical resistance is much more com­plicated than just saying "no" to repression**. Radical resistance comprises the highest consciousness of the politics of representation standing out­side the privileged circle of expression. **The goal of radical resistance must be to find effective forms of symbolic action promoting a more hu­mane social order**. **This may be very different from hurling inflammatory language** at the Palace walls. **The rhetoric or resentment sometimes in­cludes the simplistic reversal of the law of the authorities**, **or worse, the mere exchange of identities between oppressor and oppressed, without any reduction in the universe of abuse**. "To turn their evil backwards isto live," was one anagramatic formulation of this impulse.' But of course such a "radical" strategy ends by replicating the influence of the center, co-signing its alienations. Radical resistance carries its own internal contradictions—confusing gestures reaching toward liberation but hampered by the fears and psy­chic burdens that distort the movement toward a more positive social or­der. Gross hyperbole often arises out of a fear of reproducing in oneself the blindness of Cyclopism or the moral ambiguities of Weak Aesopian-ism. That same fear may also lead to muzzling the name of the colonizer, as though that name, like a ghost, will haunt and control one's own thinking. **Equally limiting is the politics of** *ressentirnent,* of spite, the dim politics of emotional venting, blind **rage**, or fantasies of extravagant, hos­tile conspiracies, **or competitions in excess verbiage rampant among the alienated.** **Beyond these simplistic reflex gestures and their momentary narcissis­tic satisfactions**, radical resistance includes the understanding that what must be resisted, as well as offensive portrayals, is a regime of represen­tation that has been centuries in the making. The logic of the present cri­sis demands a particular self-consciousness about its immanence, an awareness of its particular secret, which the dominant order wishes to keep hidden—that the future of that order is not guaranteed. That logic also insists on a double vision regarding representations, viewing them in terms of their specific historical moment, but at the same time as they function within a large-scale historical framework. Within this logic, **the alerted reader will** **never allow herself to accept the idea that a discussion about racial representation** in the Uncle Remus tales, for instance, or Charlie Chan, the Richard Pryor movie *The Toy,* or *The Emperor Jones, Imi­tation of Life, The Birth of a Nation, Amos 'n Andy, The Adventures of Huckle­berry Finn,* a racialized item on the eleven o'clock news, racist Disney films like *Jungle Book* or *Aladdin,* or the liberal lesbian movie, *Fried Green Tomatoes****,* is an isolated moment and not a fragment of a discursive se­quence intimately related to the foundation of modern slavery and high colonialism** **as they flourished in the nineteenth century** and the ration­ales for these systems laid down in the European Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. The ironies of discourse set up a situation where knowledge is being continually recoded—where one narrative is continually challenged by a counternarrative. But this inescapable fact of language is given a new ur­gency in our present historical period. Received wisdom has come under assault since the 195os on a scale unlike anything since the Euro-enlight‑enment. The present crisis of knowledge has sharpened these ironies into the needling debates of countless culture wars. Broadly speaking, the battle rages between dominant, old knowledge and resistant, new perspectives. (The usual provisos need be entered here: dominant knowl­edge is not monolithic; it is always contested from within as well as from without; and despite labels such as PC, new perspectives are also not monolithic.) At the heart of our contemporary search for reliable ways of knowing lies the fact that the systems of knowledge sponsored by the l'alace have been used in monumental lies about those outside its con­fines, and those who have been lied to and lied about have abruptly made themselves heard through withering critiques. Since World War II a bat­tery of contradictions loom before monological Euro-centered knowl­edge, accelerating toward a showdown. Indeed, the Japanese nationalism of World War II was as much a violent resistance to Western domination as was the non-violent anti-colonial movement of Ghandianism that be­gan long before that Great War. The history of global cultural resistance has yet to be written. But that resistance has grown in form and substance to give Monopolated Light and Power an unwanted, shadowy double; **wherever we encounter domi­nant, centered Western ideology, we are now aware that there is**, some­where in the immediate environment, **another story waiting to be told**. One sure sign of this doubling of discourse is the proliferation of brilliant cultural alternatives, flaunting their pagan difference from authorized "civilized" mores: the spirituals, the blues, the calinda, rumba, folktales, ragtime, *cinema nuovo,* jazz, rhythm and blues, bossa nova, Soul, reggae, highlife, zouk, hip hop. **The intent of the many alternative narratives that now contest the au­thorized version is to revise or recode its interpretations of reality**. Our father, who art in heaven The white man owe me eleven and give me seven; Thy kingdom come, they will be done, If I hadn't took that I wouldn't got none.' This ditty from enslaved Africans in the United States parodies the bib­lical "Lord's Prayer" not merely to interrogate Christianity and the West­ern claim to authority over Christian knowledge, but also as rebuttal to Christian apologies for slavery. It insinuates a hidden knowledge, based in material, economic experience as opposed to the idealistic rationales of "civilized" discourse. If the delicate, modest poems of Phillis Wheatley, the African-born slave girl who became a gifted protegee of a New En‑gland family and author of chiseled neo-classical verse, give us an early example of Weak Aesopianism, this slave song exemplifies an early in­stance of radical resistance to authorized truth.